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Chapter 3
Breaking the Silence: Why International 
Organizations Should Acknowledge Customary 
International Law Obligations to Provide Effective 
Remedies
Kristina Daugirdas and Sachi Schuricht*
Abstract
To date, international organizations have remained largely silent about their obliga-
tions under customary international law. This chapter urges international organiza-
tions to change course, and to expressly acknowledge customary international law 
obligations to provide effective remedies. Notably, international organizations’ obli-
gations to afford effective remedies need not precisely mirror States’ obligations to 
do so. Instead, international organizations may be governed by particular customary 
international law rules. By publicly acknowledging obligations to afford effective rem-
edies, international organizations can influence the development of such particular 
rules. In addition, by acknowledging obligations to afford effective remedies—and by 
actually providing effective remedies—international organizations can rebut argu-
ments that they are above the law, and can help to retain support for their jurisdic-
tional immunities.
1 Introduction
Individuals and other private actors who have been harmed by international 
organizations usually will not get very far if they seek recourse in national 
courts. Immunity typically shields international organizations from such legal 
* Kristina Daugirdas, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School, kdaugir@
umich.edu; Sachi Schuricht, Associate at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, sschur@umich.
edu. The views presented in this chapter are those of the authors alone and do not necessar-
ily represent the views of the firm or its clients. The authors would like to thank Monica 
Hakimi, Steve Ratner, and Peter Quayle for their helpful comments.
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process.1 In some cases, these private actors have recourse to other forums or 
mechanisms for resolving disputes and challenging the conduct of interna-
tional organizations. Employees of individual organizations can turn to ad-
ministrative tribunals.2 Parties who have entered into contracts with interna-
tional organizations may be able to invoke the arbitration or other dispute 
resolution mechanisms written into their contracts.3 Individuals harmed by 
the acts or omissions of multilateral development banks may be able to turn to 
specialized accountability mechanisms like the World Bank Inspection Panel 
(wbip).4 Individuals subject to the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s 
isil and Al-Qaida targeted sanctions regime may enlist the Office of the Om-
budsperson to challenge their designation.5 But many individuals harmed out-
side of the employment and commercial contexts do not have any avenue to 
seek recourse from international organizations.
There are many policy reasons for international organizations to develop 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to fill this remedial gap. Back in 
1954, the International Court of Justice (icj) observed that establishing an ad-
ministrative tribunal,
to do justice between the [United Nations] and its staff members was es-
sential to ensure the efficient working of the Secretariat, and to give ef-
fect to the paramount consideration of securing the highest standards of 
efficiency, competence, and integrity.6
Several decades later, Ibrahim Shihata, the former General Counsel of the 
World Bank, argued that the wbip would improve “the efficiency of the Bank 
and of development finance in general”.7 Finally, as international  organizations’ 
1 Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance 2014, 96 (“igos enjoy absolute immunity from na-
tional courts, granted to them either in headquarters agreements with host States or in the 
constituent treaties that bind all State parties”).
2 Kingsbury and others 2005, 20; Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance 2014, 168–171.
3 Schmitt 2017, 179–183.
4 Suzuki and Nanwani 2005, 206–219.
5 See United Nations Security Council (unsc), ‘Ombudsperson to the isil’.
6 icj, Effect of Awards 1954, 57.
7 Shihata 1994, 114–115 (“[T]he mere presence of the Panel is likely to make the Bank staff more 
diligent in the observance of Bank policies. […] Since these policies and procedures are 
meant to ensure quality in the Bank-financed projects and to serve broader institutional ob-
jectives approved by Bank members (through the Executive Directors), the greater attention 
paid to them can only serve the Bank, its members as a whole, and in particular the borrow-
ers concerned. Inspection can also raise issues not otherwise known or appreciated and may 
cause the Bank to adopt more effective or clearer standards in the pursuit of its objectives. In 
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lawyers have themselves recognized, international organizations’ immunity is 
vulnerable when injured individuals lack access to alternative dispute settle-
ment mechanisms.8
In addition, international organizations may have legal obligations to de-
velop such mechanisms. One possible source of such obligations is customary 
international law. Section 2 explains that there is a strong argument that cus-
tomary international law binds international organizations. That said, scholars 
of international law continue to debate whether all or only some customary 
rules bind international organizations. Moreover, international organizations 
have been, on the whole, conspicuously reluctant to acknowledge these obli-
gations in public statements. In any event, applying customary international 
law norms to international organizations is not entirely straightforward. In 
some cases, rules that were developed mainly by and for States must be adapt-
ed to account for differences between international organizations and States 
and for differences among international organizations.
Section 3 addresses States’ obligations to afford effective remedies to indi-
viduals who have been harmed by violations of human rights law. This section 
considers the extent to which these obligations have hardened into customary 
international law and, if so, what exactly they require of States. As evidenced 
by States’ treaty obligations, effective remedies have both procedural and sub-
stantive elements. The precise contours of the obligations, however, are not 
well defined and States retain significant discretion in crafting such remedies. 
Moreover, effective remedies are not ‘one size fits all’; the necessary compo-
nents will depend to some degree on which right is violated and the gravity of 
the violation.
Section 4 considers how an obligation to provide effective remedies might 
apply to—and be adapted for—international organizations. International or-
ganizations’ customary law obligations need not precisely mirror States’ obli-
gations. Instead, international organizations may be governed by particular 
customary international law rules. Most significantly, this section argues that 
the process, it can enhance the awareness of the borrowers of deficiencies in their own pro-
cesses and attitudes that need to be corrected […]. The end result should increase the effi-
ciency of the Bank and of development finance in general”). See also Benvenisti, The Applica-
bility of the Law of Occupation 2019 (focusing on UN-led instances of territorial administration 
and arguing that “accountability is not a burden on functionality. Rather, accountability en-
hances functionality, and in fact, it is necessary for ensuring functionality”).
8 See, for example, Amerasinghe 1982; Kwakwa 2010, 600; Martha 2012, 93–94; ibid, 125 (“[M]ost 
of the calls for eliminating or restricting the immunities of international organizations in-
voke the absence of alternative dispute-settlement mechanisms for noncontractual disputes 
in order to justify why the concept of immunity is anathema to the concept of fair play and 
substantial justice”).
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the scope of international organizations’ obligations to provide effective rem-
edies may well be broader than those of States for two reasons. Such particular 
customary rules may build on treaty obligations that require international 
 organizations to develop alternative dispute settlement mechanisms in cases 
that do not necessarily involve a violation of international law. In addition, 
such norms may develop from the practice of international organizations—
like the wbip and similar institutions at other multilateral development 
banks—that likewise provide remedies to individuals who have been harmed 
in instances that may not involve a violation of international law.
Section 5 urges international organizations to not only afford effective 
 remedies—but to expressly acknowledge a customary international law obli-
gation to do so. The International Law Commission (ilc) recently affirmed 
that international organizations can contribute to the development of custom-
ary international law.9 By speaking out about their obligations to afford effec-
tive remedies, international organizations can actively shape the development 
of customary international law in this area. Moreover, such engagement can 
help to ensure the sustainability of international organizations’ immunities. 
The perception that international organizations are above the law erodes their 
legitimacy—and in particular, support for their immunity.10 By publicly ac-
knowledging legal obligations to afford effective remedies—and ensuring that 
they do indeed provide effective remedies—international organizations can 
better defend against such charges.
2 International Organizations’ Obligations Under Customary 
International Law
In some cases, international organizations have express treaty obligations to 
develop alternative mechanisms for resolving disputes that cannot be resolved 
by national courts on account of their jurisdictional immunity.11 Often, 
9 ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law’ 2018, conclu-
sion 4(2) (“In certain cases, the practice of international organizations also contributes to 
the formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law”).
10 Boon 2016, 375 (“[A]s a matter of public legitimacy, the UN must not be seen to be above 
the law”); Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and Responsibility’ 2014, 1007–1009. For examples in the 
popular press, see Yeoman, 27 September 2018; Rosen, 26 February 2013 (“The organiza-
tion is functionally above the law—and victims of Haiti’s cholera outbreak aren’t the only 
ones paying the price”).
11 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (General Conven-
tion), art viii, s 29; Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agen-
cies (Specialized Agencies Convention), art ix, s 31; see also Berenson 2012, 139 (describing 
multilateral and bilateral agreements that the Organization of American States has 
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 however, such treaty obligations are limited or nonexistent. As a result, any 
cross-cutting obligation to afford effective remedies must come from another 
source of law. The most promising candidate is customary international law.12 
But to what extent does customary international law bind international or-
ganizations? It turns out that the answer to this question remains somewhat 
contested.
Arguments that customary international law binds international organiza-
tions often reference a 1980 advisory opinion of the icj concerning the legality 
of efforts to relocate the regional office of the World Health Organization 
(who) in Alexandria, Egypt.13 Egypt had protested that the proposed reloca-
tion would violate a 1951 bilateral treaty between itself and the who. In the 
course of a paragraph that makes the obviously correct and rather trivial point 
that international organizations lack an absolute right to select the location of 
their offices, the Court wrote:
International organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, 
are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules 
of international law, under their constitutions or under international 
agreements to which they are parties.14
Paraphrasing this sentence, many scholars have affirmed that customary 
 international law binds international organizations.15 Others have expressed 
doubts, citing the lack of practice to support this conclusion, or taking the po-
sition that the icj was referring to only a subset of customary international law 
rules.16 After all, the statement that international organizations are bound by 
concluded); Reinisch, ‘Immunity’ 2008, 288 (describing the International Atomic Energy 
Agency’s headquarters agreement with Austria).
12 The charters of individual organizations may also be sources of such obligations; so too 
may be other international agreements to which organizations are parties, such as the 
specialized agencies’ relationship agreements with the United Nations. See, for example, 
Verdirame 2011; Skogly 2001. The literature on global administrative law suggests some 
possibilities outside the traditional sources of international law. See Benvenisti, The Law 
of Global Governance 2014, 91–137 (suggesting that such principles are binding based on 
‘rule of law’ principles, international human rights law, or trusteeship); Kingsbury and 
others 2005, 29 (proposing a ‘revived version of ius gentium’).
13 icj, Interpretation of the Agreement Between the who and Egypt 1980.
14 Ibid, para 37.
15 See Reinisch, ‘Accountability’ 2001, 136; Brunnée 2005, 40; Benvenisti, The Law of Global 
Governance 2014, 99; Shelton 2015, 46.
16 Alvarez 2007, 677; Klabbers 2017, 987; see also Wellens 2002, 1 (“As subjects of interna-
tional law, international organizations […] are subject to rules and norms of customary 
international law to the extent required by their functional powers […]”).
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“any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international 
law” leaves open the question of which obligations so qualify.17
For their part, most international organizations have said little or nothing 
about whether and to what extent customary international law binds them.18 
They have neither expressly rejected nor acknowledged the applicability of 
customary international law other than jus cogens norms.19
Some international organizations weighed in on this question several dec-
ades ago during the deliberations over the set of draft articles adopted by the 
ilc that were eventually codified as the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between Interna-
tional Organizations.20 A number of organizations sought to ensure that any 
rules resulting from this process could not bind them without their consent.21 
Some advocated against negotiating a treaty at all. Instead, they proposed that 
the General Assembly adopt the Commission’s draft articles “as a standard of 
reference for action destined to harden into customary international law”.22 
This proposal indicates that these organizations understood such customary 
rules would bind them; otherwise, their proposal does not make sense.
More recently, the ilc’s development of draft articles regarding the respon-
sibility of international organizations provided another opportunity for inter-
national organizations to address their obligations under customary interna-
tional law. The final set of articles, adopted in 2011, includes a provision that 
describes the elements of an internationally wrongful act of an international 
organization, indicating that there is such an act when “conduct consisting of 
an action or omission: (a) is attributable to that organization under interna-
tional law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that 
17 icj, Interpretation of the Agreement Between the who and Egypt 1980, para 37 (emphasis 
added).
18 Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 372–380; see also Benvenisti, The Applicability of the Law 
of Occupation 2019, 3–4 (describing the United Nations’ silence with respect to the legal 
framework that applies to UN-led administration of territories); Wellens 2002 (noting a 
long-established “reluctance by international organizations to acknowledge in explicit 
terms a legal obligation to comply with human rights”).
19 As defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (vclt), art 53, a jus cogens or 
peremptory norm is “a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same char-
acter”. See also Frowein, 2013.
20 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organiza-
tions or Between International Organizations, art 34.
21 Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 373–377.
22 Ibid, 375.
Kristina Daugirdas and Sachi Schuricht - 9789004441033




organization”.23 The commentary elaborated on this second element, noting 
that the breached obligation may “result from either a treaty binding the inter-
national organization or from any other source of international law applicable 
to the organization”.24 The commentary then quotes the same indeterminate 
sentence from the who-Egypt advisory opinion, and notes that a “breach is 
possible with regard to any of these international obligations”25—that is, the 
obligations “incumbent upon [international organizations] under general 
rules of international law, under their constitutions or under international 
agreements to which they are parties”.26 Thus, the ilc did not stake out a posi-
tion on the question of which customary international law rules bind interna-
tional organizations.
In their comments to the ilc, participating international organizations gen-
erally agreed that jus cogens norms bind them. A handful said so explicitly, and 
none contested this conclusion.27 When it came to other customary interna-
tional law norms, however, the organizations that submitted comments did 
not embrace their application. No organizations directly rejected the view that 
customary international law binds them—but none directly acknowledged 
such obligations either.28 Some organizations did suggest that customary in-
ternational law had virtually no relevance for international organizations be-
cause their charters reflect lex specialis—or specific rules that displace the 
more generally applicable rules regarding the responsibility of international 
organizations.29 Take, for example, these comments by the International 
 Monetary Fund:
23 ilc, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations’ 2011, art 4.
24 Ibid, art 4, comm (2).
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 378–379 and n 301 (quoting comments from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the World Bank).
28 For a more detailed discussion of international organizations’ comments, see Daugirdas, 
‘How and Why’ 2016, 377–380.
29 The lex specialis principle provides that when both a general and a more specific rule 
govern the same subject matter, the specific rule should take precedence over the more 
general rule. Koskenniemi 2006, para 60 (“A special rule is more to the point […] than a 
general one and it regulates the matter more effectively […] than general rules. This could 
also be expressed by saying that special rules are better able to take account of particular 
circumstances. The need to comply with them is felt more acutely than is the case with 
general rules. They have greater clarity and definiteness and are thus often felt ‘harder’ or 
more ‘binding’ than general rules which may stay in the background and be applied only 
rarely. Moreover, lex specialis may also seem useful as it may provide better access to what 
the parties may have willed”). See also Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 347–348. Note that 
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[W]hen an organization acts in accordance with the terms of its constitu-
ent charter, such acts can only be wrongful in relation to another norm of 
international law if the other norm in question is either a “peremptory 
norm” ( jus cogens) or arises from a specific obligation that has been in-
curred by the organization in the course of its activities ([for example], 
by entering into a separate treaty with another subject of international 
law). However, vis-à-vis all other norms of international law, both the 
charter and the internal rules of the organization would be lex specialis as 
far as the organization’s responsibility is concerned and, accordingly, 
cannot be overridden by lex generalis, which would include the provi-
sions of the draft articles.30
It would be a mistake to interpret these comments as implying a categorical 
rejection of the view that customary international law binds international or-
ganizations.31 First, the lex specialis argument is limited to relations between 
international organizations and their member States: it does not affect the 
point that customary international law governs relations between internation-
al organizations and non-member States. Second, it is important to keep in 
mind that when States create lex specialis, they are not necessarily rejecting 
general international law. Sometimes lex specialis is an elaboration or specifi-
cation of an already-applicable, general international law rule. And even when 
States do create lex specialis to diverge from otherwise-applicable general in-
ternational law, general international law norms persist in the background. 
Those norms fill gaps and influence the interpretation of treaties—including 
constituent instruments that establish international organizations. Finally, 
treaties that create lex specialis are presumed to align with customary interna-
tional law unless States have made clear their desire to diverge from it.32 As a 
result, these rules are already implicit in international organizations’ charters 
except to the extent that their charters provide to the contrary.
In this context, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (aiib) is a 
 refreshing—and admirable—counterexample. The aiib website includes the 
following statement:
there are some limitations on States’ capacity to derogate from customary international 
law by creating lex specialis. Ibid, 346–347.
30 ilc, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations’, 1 May 2007, 5 (emphases added). For 
other examples of similar statements, see Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 378–379.
31 Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 379–380.
32 Ibid, 348.
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aiib is an international organization established by the aiib Articles of 
Agreement (entered into force on December 25, 2015), a multilateral trea-
ty, the Parties to which comprise the Membership of the Bank. Accord-
ingly, aiib is both constituted and governed by public international law, 
the sources of which include applicable international conventions, cus-
tomary international law, general principles of law and subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.33
Just as the icj’s who-Egypt opinion raised questions about which rules are 
‘incumbent upon’ international organizations, the aiib’s statement on inter-
national law leaves unaddressed the question of which customary internation-
al law rules are ‘applicable’ to the aiib. But the acknowledgement of at least 
some customary international law obligations is notable nonetheless.
In prior work, one of the present authors sought to supply a firmer founda-
tion for the conclusion that the entire corpus of customary international law 
does indeed bind international organizations, at least as a default matter.34 
The argument goes, in short, that this conclusion holds regardless of whether 
one conceives of international organizations as peers of States on the interna-
tional plane (that is, as entities that exercise independent authority as both a 
formal legal matter and as a practical matter)35 or as vehicles through which 
States act.36 The reasons for the conclusion differ, however. On the peer view, 
customary international law automatically binds international organizations, 
just as it binds new States, by virtue of their status as members of the interna-
tional community.37 From the vehicle perspective, the underlying concern is 
that States will try to evade their international obligations by acting through 
international organizations. Here, treaty law supplies the relevant baseline: 
what States can do directly by treaty, they can do indirectly through an interna-
tional organization. And what States cannot do directly by treaty, they cannot 
do indirectly through an international organization.38 Thus, States cannot cre-
ate international organizations that are unbound by customary international 
law vis-à-vis non-member States because the pacta tertiis rule precludes States 
from using treaties to modify their international obligations to non-parties.39 
States can use treaties to create lex specialis and modify their customary 
33 aiib, ‘The Role of Law’.
34 Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 325.
35 See ibid, 359–365.
36 Ibid, 345.
37 See ibid, 357–359 and 365–368.
38 Ibid, 345.
39 The pacta tertiis rule is codified in the vclt, art 34 (“A treaty does not create either obliga-
tions or rights for a third State without its consent”). See also Chinkin 1993, 71 (“Treaties 
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 international law obligations to other parties—but, as noted above, treaties 
are generally interpreted to align with customary international law unless 
States have made clear their desire to diverge from it.40 Thus, when it comes to 
an international organization’s interactions with its member States, customary 
international law binds the organization except to the extent that the member 
States have clearly expressed their desire for the organization to diverge from 
it.41 In sum, customary international law binds international organizations to 
the same degree that it binds States: international organizations are not more 
extensively or more readily bound, nor are they less extensively or less readily 
bound.
3 States’ Obligations to Afford Effective Remedies
Numerous international human rights treaties expressly require States to af-
ford effective remedies to victims of human rights violations. There is a plausi-
ble, albeit not uncontested, argument that over the past several decades this 
obligation has—in at least some contexts—ripened into a norm of customary 
international law.
As a starting point, article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(udhr) provides that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by com-
petent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him 
by the constitution or by law”.42 Although the status of the udhr as a binding 
source of international law is unsettled,43 it is foundational to many other hu-
man rights instruments. Among those is the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (iccpr), which similarly obligates each State party to 
 provide effective remedies for violations of rights protected by that instru-
ment. Article 2(3) reads:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recog-
nized are violated shall have an effective remedy notwithstanding 
bind consenting parties only, and strangers to any treaty are legally unaffected by it. This 
is the classic rule of treaties and third parties […]”).
40 Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 347–348.
41 Ibid.
42 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (udhr), art 8.
43 Hannum 1996, 317–335 (summarizing varying customary treatment of the udhr, where-
by some States treat all of the articulated rights as customary international law while 
others consider only some of them binding).
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that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an offi-
cial capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have the 
right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provid-
ed for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibili-
ties of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such reme-
dies when granted.44
Similar guarantees are found in other human rights treaties.45
Surveys of State practice have reached inconsistent results as to whether 
States consistently provide effective remedies for violations of human rights, 
and whether they do so with a sense of legal obligation. One survey of State 
practice in 1995 indicated that the right to an effective remedy was “not gener-
ally included in lists of customary human rights and [was] not the subject of 
significant domestic jurisprudence”.46 Likewise, in 2001, another scholar took 
the view that,
44 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr), art 2(3).
45 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (echr), art 13 (guaranteeing to “[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth 
in this Convention are violated […] an effective remedy before a national authority”); 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art 6 (obligating 
state parties to assure “effective protection and remedies, through the competent nation-
al tribunals and other State institutions […] as well as the right to seek from such tribunals 
just and adequate reparation or satisfaction”); American Convention on Human Rights, 
art 25 (“Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective re-
course, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his funda-
mental rights”; obliging state parties “(a) To ensure that any person claiming such remedy 
shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal 
system of the state; (b) To develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and (c) To ensure 
that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted”); Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art 47 (“Everyone whose rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy be-
fore a tribunal […]”). For a comprehensive discussion of relevant human rights instru-
ments, see Shelton 2015, 63–73.
46 Hannum 1996, 345; see ibid, 329–335 (noting that governments of the US, Denmark, Swit-
zerland, Australia and New Zealand had not specified whether article 8 of the udhr 
counts among the rights therein that qualify as customary international law, while offi-
cials from Singapore, China and Germany (and a court from South Africa) had made 
statements according less-than-binding status to the entire udhr).
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treaty practice as such does not yet provide a sufficiently broad basis for 
the conclusion that today access to effective judicial or administrative 
proceedings is an entitlement enshrined in general, [which is to say], cus-
tomary international law.47
However, other scholars have surveyed State practice over largely the same pe-
riod and concluded that States do recognize “the duty to provide a remedy to 
victims’ of human rights violations”.48 Notably, the most recent and compre-
hensive review of human rights remedies, completed by Dinah Shelton in 2015, 
recognizes that “national tribunals [are] hear[ing] and decid[ing] more cases 
alleging violations of international human rights norms”,49 “as states have in-
creasingly limited their governmental immunities and developed innovative 
responses to human rights violations”.50 Extensive work in this area led Shel-
ton to conclude that “[t]he right to a remedy is well established, even a norm 
of customary international law”.51 Other scholars, and some international 
courts, have reached the similar conclusion that treaty-based rights to reme-
dies reflect customary international law rules.52
If it is a customary international law norm, what does the obligation to pro-
vide an effective remedy require of States? International human rights instru-
ments that articulate a right to an effective remedy tend to employ vague terms 
47 Handl 2001, 52.
48 Bassiouni 2006, 218–221(surveying contemporary state practice as reflected in constitu-
tions, legislative proposals, and legal systems). The inconsistencies among these surveys 
may be due to changes over time and to the authors’ consideration of different source 
materials. For instance, Bassiouni’s survey included proposed legislation that had not yet 
been adopted by several States (Ibid, 218, n 67).
49 Shelton 2015, 91.
50 Ibid, 141.
51 Ibid, 238.
52 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), Aloeboetoe v Suriname (Repara-
tions) 1993, para 43 (describing Article 63(1) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, which requires remedies for violations of human rights, as a codified rule of cus-
tomary law); cf Permanent Court of International Justice (pcij), Case Concerning the Fac-
tory at Chorzów 1927, 21 (describing the obligation to make adequate reparations as “a 
principle of international law” which applies regardless of its express articulation in a 
treaty). See also Reinisch, ‘Immunity’ 2008, 287 (suggesting that the obligation to provide 
a legal remedy is “implicitly contained in the customary international law prohibition of 
a denial of justice”); Bradlow, ‘Shield as a Sword’ 2017, 60–61; International Commission of 
Jurists 2018, 19 (noting that the “obligation is enshrined in so many international human 
rights treaties, and confirmed by international jurisprudence, that it can be considered to 
be an obligation of customary international law”).
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and do not enunciate specific modalities for providing recourse.53 While States 
have considerable discretion to design remedial mechanisms, it is clear that an 
effective remedy encompasses both procedural and substantive elements.54 
Many human rights instruments refer specifically to both procedural mecha-
nisms and substantive reparations.55 Some, most notably the iccpr, do not 
explicitly require substantive reparations, but UN treaty bodies have under-
stood even a general reference to an “effective remedy” as encompassing both 
procedural and substantive relief.56 As scholars have observed, these two ele-
ments are complementary: “a right of reparation is […] an empty victory if 
there is no corresponding mechanism to provide […] a forum to press a claim 
or obtain an award”.57
Importantly, what qualifies as an effective remedy will depend on the right 
that is violated, as well as on the gravity of the violation.58 With respect to 
 procedural relief, some instruments refer specifically to the development of 
judicial remedies.59 However, most refer more broadly to the provision of 
53 See Lasco 2003, 3 (observing that “many international human rights instruments […] pro-
vide rights in vague terms that allow each state to interpret ‘remedy’ as it sees fit”).
54 Shelton 2015, 58 (“Most texts guarantee both the procedural right of effective access to a 
fair hearing and the substantive right to a remedy”). The former element is often referred 
to as ‘the right of access to justice’ and the latter as ‘substantive redress’. Ibid, 17. How-
ever, some scholars understand these terms—and their relationships to one  another—
differently. See Schmitt 2017, 92–95 (discussing various conceptions of the right of ac-
cess to justice, and positing that “the right of access to justice […] concentrates on the 
procedural aspect while the [right to a remedy] focuses on the substantive result of the 
proceedings”).
55 echr, art 6.
56 Human Rights Committee (hrc), ‘General Comment No 31’ 2004, para 16 (as explained by 
the hrc in its interpretation of iccpr, art 2(3), “[w]ithout reparation to individuals 
whose Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an effective remedy 
[…] is not discharged”); pcij, Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów 1927, 21 (the pcij 
employed similar logic nearly a century ago, when it explained that the obligation to pro-
vide substantive reparations need not be spelled out in a treaty, for it is “the indispensable 
complement of a failure to apply” protections that are expressly articulated in a binding 
text).
57 Bassiouni 2006, 232; see also ibid (“One of the cornerstones of a victim’s right to repara-
tions is that States have an obligation to have some form of mechanism in place to redress 
violations of their international and domestic legal obligations”).
58 See International Law Association (ila) 2004, 37 (noting that “the procedural aspects of 
remedial action will vary amongst the different categories of potential claimants”); Inter-
national Commission of Jurists 2018, 77 (citing cases where the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) held that the right to a remedy, in echr, art 13, does not require a judicial 
remedy in all instances; rather, “the scope of the remedy varies with the right” at stake).
59 See iccpr, art 2(3)(b); unga, ‘Basic Principles’ 2005, princ 12 (recognizing “access to an 
effective judicial remedy” as part of the right to remedies); see also Shelton 2015, 96 
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‘ competent’ tribunals,60 which may include judicial, administrative or legisla-
tive authorities—or a combination thereof.61 Whatever the nature of the tri-
bunal, in order to provide effective procedural relief, the tribunal should be 
independent and impartial,62 widely accessible63 and capable of processing 
( “Access to justice means ensuring the possibility for an injured individual or group to 
bring a claim before an appropriate tribunal and have it adjudicated, increasingly this 
means by judicial proceedings”).
60 See udhr, art 8; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art 
6 (referring to “competent national tribunals and other State institutions”); Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art 2(c) (referring to 
“competent national tribunals and other public institutions”).
61 hrc, ‘General Comment No 31’ 2004, para 15 (various UN treaty bodies have espoused a 
combination approach. For instance, in its interpretation of iccpr, art 2(3), the hrc 
stressed the importance of establishing both judicial and administrative mechanisms, the 
latter of which “are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to investi-
gate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively through independent 
and impartial bodies”); Committee on the Rights of the Child (crc), ‘General Comment 
No 16’ 2013, para 71 (as another example, in General Comment No 16 on State Obligations 
Regarding the Impact of the Business Sector on Children’s Rights, the crc stated that “[n]
on-judicial mechanisms, such as mediation, conciliation and arbitration, can be useful 
alternatives” to judicial process, but should be provided “without prejudice to the right to 
judicial remedy”).
62 See Bradlow, ‘Amicus Brief ’, 17 August 2016, 20–21 (reviewing the ECtHR’s decisions about 
“reasonable alternative means of remedy” and concluding that qualifying forums are con-
sistently ‘independent’ and ‘impartial’); International Commission of Jurists 2018, 16 and 
52; see also Shelton 2015, 96 (“[Access to justice] means the right to seek a remedy before 
a tribunal which is constituted by law and which is independent and impartial in the ap-
plication of the law”); ibid, 100–102 (discussing the meaning of independence and impar-
tiality in the context of international human rights law); Schmitt 2017, 108 (proposing 
“core institutional requirements” of the right of access to justice, including “the right to an 
independent and impartial ‘tribunal’ established by law”).
63 To ensure accessibility, information about the accountability mechanism should be dis-
tributed widely and resources should be allocated so that barriers (often a lack of finan-
cial resources or expertise) do not prevent those harmed from accessing procedural rem-
edies. See, for example, hrc, ‘General Comment No 32’ 2017 (interpreting iccpr, art 14 to 
require equality of access and equality of arms); unga, ‘Basic Principles’ 2005, princ 
12(a)-(d), 24 (encouraging states to publicly and privately disseminate information about 
available remedies and to provide assistance to victims to ensure that they can exercise 
their rights to remedies); see also International Commission of Jurists 2018, 71 (noting “a 
tendency towards recognition […] that an effective remedy implies a positive obligation 
… to assist those persons who do not have the means to access justice”); Bassiouni 2006, 
260–263 (discussing the duty on states to make known the availability of remedies for 
human rights violations and to ensure that victims can exercise their rights to such rem-
edies); Shelton 2015, 98 (observing that “most human rights tribunals have held that if the 
failure to provide legal aid interferes with the right to pursue legal remedies […] it is itself 
a human rights violation”).
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claims promptly.64 Finally, the tribunal should be empowered to render more 
than merely advisory opinions or recommendations.65
Much like the procedural component of the remedy, the nature of effective 
substantive relief depends on the circumstances of a given case.66 To a signifi-
cant degree, the substantive component of an effective remedy tracks the ele-
ments of reparations required for violations of international law.67 An effective 
remedy may involve restitution, or relief that restores the claimant to the same 
position occupied prior to the wrong; this is generally considered the most ef-
fective substantive remedy.68 When that is not possible, compensation can 
cover the cost imposed by the wrong.69 If those remedies are not effective, or if 
the wrong is particularly blameworthy, rehabilitation or satisfaction—such as 
a public apology, acknowledgment of misconduct, or expression of regret—
may be appropriate.70 For example, in the case of repeat or widespread wrongs, 
effective substantive remedies might include a guarantee of non-repetition or 
64 See, for example, unga, ‘Basic Principles’ 2005, princ 11(b); International Commission of 
Jurists 2018, 66 (reviewing ECtHR jurisprudence on the importance of promptness); Shel-
ton 2015, 102 (“The speed with which a remedy can be obtained may be relevant in assess-
ing its effectiveness”). Similarly, regional human rights conventions require the determi-
nation of rights and obligations “within a reasonable time”. See, for example, echr, art 
6(1); American Convention on Human Rights, art 8(1).
65 See, for example, unga, ‘Basic Principles’, 2005, princ 17 (encouraging states to provide 
“effective mechanisms for the enforcement of reparation judgments”); International 
Commission of Jurists 2018, 81 (“If the judicial power lacks the means to carry out its judg-
ments, the remedy cannot be considered to be effective”); Shelton 2015, 94 (discussing 
jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which requires 
remedies that are “sufficient, i.e. capable of redressing the violation” and not “discretion-
ary”); Schmitt 2017, 112 (emphasizing the importance of a tribunal with “the power to is-
sue binding decisions which may not be altered by non-judicial authorities”).
66 See, for example, icj, Avena Case 2004, para 119 (“reparation in an adequate form’ varies 
‘depending on the concrete circumstances surrounding each case and the precise nature 
and scope of the injury”); ila 2004, 35 (“With regard to the potential [substantive] out-
come of remedies, there seems to be a connection between the identity of the party seek-
ing redress, the kind of accountability involved, and the forum before which the remedial 
action has been brought”).
67 See Shelton 2015, 32 (“The law of state responsibility […] contains useful precedents for 
evaluating the nature and scope of remedies afforded in state practice”); see also ilc, 
‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ 2001, arts 
34–39 (addressing forms of reparation for injury, including restitution, compensation, 
and satisfaction).
68 Shelton 2015, 19, 33–34, 298, 307 (noting that restitution is the “preferred remedy” among 
regional human rights courts) and 384.
69 Ibid, 19 and 315 (describing compensation as “a substitute remedy”).
70 Ibid, 42–43, 394–397; see, for example, unga, ‘Basic Principles’ 2005, princ 18 and 21 (in-
cluding rehabilitation as a potential form of redress); hrc, ‘General Comment No 31’, para 
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public exposure of the truth.71 For grave breaches of human rights, the obliga-
tion to afford an effective remedy includes a duty of the State concerned to 
prosecute and punish the person responsible.72
Because the requirements of an effective remedy vary by context, and be-
cause States have significant discretion in shaping such remedies, it is difficult 
to discern consistent patterns in the type, amount, or frequency of reparations 
awarded.73 However, in her detailed survey of human rights remedies, Dinah 
Shelton has recognized “a growing consensus on minimum standards”74 of 
redress awarded by subsets of decision-making bodies. For instance, among 
international arbitral tribunals, compensation is “the most usual form of 
reparation”,75 although such tribunals regularly award various forms of sat-
isfaction as well.76 In the case of UN treaty bodies, such as the Human Rights 
Committee, recommendations for compensation are often accompanied by 
measures aimed at providing restitution and preventing reoccurrences.77 Last-
ly, while regional human rights courts differ widely in the specificity of their 
reparation decisions, they regularly consider compensation appropriate and 
are increasingly ordering or recommending restitution and satisfaction, when 
appropriate.78
16 (explaining that the reparations required under iccpr art 2(3) can involve “rehabilita-
tion and measures of satisfaction”).
71 See Shelton 2015, 22–24 (discussing restorative justice principles) and 112–120 (discussing 
the right to truth); Bassiouni 2006, 275–276 (discussing the right to truth).
72 Francioni 2007, 36–37.
73 Shelton 2015, 106 (noting latitude afforded to states in awarding reparations under inter-
national human rights instruments), 143 (noting discretion afforded to international arbi-
trators in awarding reparations, but also arguing that scholarly criticisms that such prac-
tice is “inconsistent, even incoherent” are “overstated”), 383 (acknowledging another 
scholar’s argument that “jurisprudence demonstrates the principle of the complete free-
dom of the judge or arbitrator, that there are no rules for reparations”), 376 (noting the 
“highly variable” and “unpredictable” awards by human rights tribunals).
74 Ibid, 19; see also ibid, 298 and 314 (noting consensus among international human rights 
bodies that restitution is the preferred remedy, but compensation, rehabilitation and sat-
isfaction may be afforded as a substitute).
75 Ibid, 146.
76 Ibid, 159 (noting that international arbitrators often award “[p]ecuniary satisfaction” and 
have begun to view declaratory judgments as another form of satisfaction).
77 Ibid, 196–200, 306 (noting various types of restitution recommended by the hrc) and 321 
(noting that UN treaty bodies “often call for compensation […] but never quantify the 
amount due”).
78 Ibid, 205–232 (discussing the ECtHR, which “continues to insist that it is for the states to 
choose the method of remedying the violation” but has “moved toward more of an em-
phasis on non-repetition of the violation and on restitution”, as well as the IACtHR, which 
frequently orders compensation and is increasingly insisting that states publicly acknowl-
edge violations), 307 (noting that both the European and Inter-American courts “now 
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In sum, effective remedies are not ‘one size fits all’. This point is especially 
important in evaluating how obligations to afford such remedies apply to in-
ternational organizations.
4 International Organizations’ Obligations to Provide Effective 
Remedies
The authors of this chapter are not the first to suggest that the customary inter-
national law obligation to provide effective remedies extends beyond States to 
international organizations.79 This chapter emphasizes three points, however, 
that have not garnered adequate attention. First, international organization 
are not simply passive recipients of customary international law rules; they 
have an active role to play in developing the rules that bind them. Second, in 
some cases, international organizations’ obligations with respect to effective 
remedies might diverge from States’ obligations. Just as distinct rules govern 
treaties to which international organizations are parties and the international 
responsibility of international organizations, so too there may be—or there 
may yet emerge—rules concerning effective remedies that are particular to 
international organizations. Third, the applicable rules may in some cases be 
further adapted for the circumstances of individual organizations through the 
development of lex specialis.
With the express support of a number of States and some international or-
ganizations, the ilc recently affirmed that international organizations can di-
rectly contribute to the development of customary international law.80 As the 
ilc put it, in certain cases, the practice and opinio juris of international 
 indicate that restitution is the preferred remedy where this is possible”), 385–388 (dis-
cussing evolution of the ECtHR’s reparations awards) and 396–399 (discussing the wide 
range of the IACtHR’s orders requiring satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition).
79 See, for example, Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance 2014, 110–111 (proposing that 
international organizations are “subject to at least basic human rights norms that require 
them to comply with procedural and due process obligations toward affected individu-
als”); Bradlow, ‘Shield as a Sword’ 2017, 60–61; ila 2004, 33 (noting that “[a]s a general 
principle of law and as a basic international human rights standard, the right to a remedy 
also applies to ios in their dealings with states and non-state parties’ and ‘may be seen as 
a norm of customary international law”); Schmitt 2017, 118 (“[A] customary law to estab-
lish administrative dispute settlement mechanisms is progressively emerging for interna-
tional organizations”).
80 Daugirdas, ‘Creation of Customary International Law’ forthcoming, 32.
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 organizations “as such” may give rise or attest to customary international law 
rules.81
There are several key areas of practice by international organizations, as 
such, that are directly relevant to establishing and assessing possible custom-
ary international law rules concerning effective remedies for violations of indi-
viduals’ rights under international human rights law. Most, if not all, interna-
tional organizations have established access to administrative tribunals to 
resolve employment disputes. These tribunals were established at least in part 
to vindicate individual rights under international law.82 The Security Council 
established the Ombudsperson for the Al-Qaida and isil sanctions regime fol-
lowing successful legal challenges and widespread criticism that the sanctions 
regime violated the human rights of designated individuals.83 And the Kosovo 
Human Rights Advisory Panel was specifically established to examine alleged 
violations of human rights by the UN Mission in Kosovo.84
This practice by international organizations could contribute to the devel-
opment of customary international law rules regarding effective remedies that 
apply to States and international organizations alike—but it may also, or alter-
natively, contribute to the development of rules that apply only to interna-
tional organizations, or only to subsets of them. There is room for the emer-
gence of such particularized rules with respect to international organizations’ 
obligations to provide effective remedies.
In its recent work on identifying rules of customary international law, the 
ilc affirmed the category of “particular customary international law” rules 
81 ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law’ 2018, concl 4; 
see also Daugirdas, ‘Creation of Customary International Law’ forthcoming, 1 (arguing 
this view is correct and supplying a fuller rationale for this conclusion).
82 See, for example, ilc, ‘Comments and Observations’ 2004, 31 (“The area in which the oas 
has had to respond to claims alleging violation of international law is labour relations. 
Indeed, the Organization’s decisions to establish an Administrative Tribunal in 1971 was, 
in part, based on the need to provide a forum for adjudicating those claims consistent 
with international standards of due process and additional standards established by the 
International Labor Organization”); Amerasinghe 1982 (“A second reason for the estab-
lishment of the [administrative] tribunal is […] a principle accepted in many national 
legal systems and reaffirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This principle 
requires that where administrative power is exercised there should be available machin-
ery, in the event of disputes, to accord a fair hearing and due process to the aggrieved 
party”); Kwakwa 2010 (addressing the “human rights obligations of international organi-
zations vis-à-vis their staff members” and responding to criticisms that existing mecha-
nisms for resolving disputes with staff members fail to satisfy those obligations).
83 See unsc, ‘Ombudsperson to the isil’.
84 Human Rights Advisory Panel, ‘Kosovo’ 2016, 3.
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that bind only a limited number of States, excluding those States that do not 
participate in the practice or assent to be bound by it.85 The Commission has 
limited its discussion to particular customary law that has emerged, or might 
emerge, among groups of States linked by geography or by common cause, in-
terest, or activity.86 This concept can likewise apply to international organiza-
tions as a category, or even to subcategories of international organizations.87 
Particular customary international law rules can thus account for differences 
between States and international organizations, as well as differences among 
international organizations. This kind of tailoring is especially appropriate in 
the context of obligations to provide effective remedies.
One important way that international organizations’ obligations may differ 
from those of States concerns the scope of international organizations’ obliga-
tions to provide effective remedies. Specifically, international organizations’ 
obligations may be broader than States’ obligations in that they apply not only 
to violations of human rights, but also to other instances where international 
organizations cause harm to private individuals.88
Two main bodies of practice support this claim. First, as noted above, some 
international organizations have express treaty obligations to develop alterna-
tive dispute settlement mechanisms when legal process is blocked in national 
courts on account of the organizations’ jurisdictional immunities.89 For exam-
ple, the ‘Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations’ 
(General Convention) and the ‘Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the Specialized Agencies’ (Specialized Agencies Convention) contain near-
identical language in this regard. Article viii, Section 29 of the former 
provides:
85 ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law’ 2018, concl 16 
and related comm.
86 Ibid.
87 Daugirdas, ‘Creation of Customary International Law’ forthcoming, 10–11 (suggesting that 
particular customary international law rules might emerge that apply specifically to inter-
national financial organizations).
88 In some cases, States have treaty obligations to provide compensation for lawful activities 
that cause harm. See, for example, Ronzitti 2007, 115; Guttinger 2010.
89 General Convention, art viii, s 29; Specialized Agencies Convention, art ix, s 31; see also 
Berenson 2012, 139 (describing multilateral and bilateral agreements that the Organiza-
tion of American States has concluded); Reinisch, ‘Immunity’ 2008, 288 (describing the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s headquarters agreement with Austria).
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The United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of set-
tlement of:
(a) Disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law 
character to which the United Nations is a party;
(b) Disputes involving any official of the United Nations who by reason 
of his official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been 
waived by the Secretary-General.90
Implementing these obligations, the United Nations has established proce-
dures for handling, among other things, disputes arising out of commercial 
agreements, including contracts and lease agreements; tort claims arising from 
acts within the Headquarters district in New York; and claims arising from ac-
cidents involving vehicles operated by UN personnel for official purposes.91
The second body of relevant practice includes the World Bank Inspection 
Panel (wbip) and similar institutions at other multilateral development 
banks.92 At the World Bank, this inspection mechanism is open to individuals 
who have been harmed by the Bank’s violations of certain of its own policies 
and procedures.93 These ‘safeguard policies’ address a range of environmental 
and social issues—but there is no explicit safeguard policy addressing human 
rights.94 Violations of these policies might constitute violations of internation-
al law—but there is no requirement that they do so. Notably, there are no trea-
ty provisions that expressly demand the establishment of the wbip or other 
similar mechanisms; instead, they have been established and refined based on 
90 General Convention, art viii, s 29; Specialized Agencies Convention, art ix, s 31.
91 UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’ 1995; see also Difference Relating to Immunity from 
Legal Process Verbatim Record (1998), paras 5–14 (explanation by the UN Legal Counsel of 
the remedial regime established by art viii, s 29 of the Convention).
92 For a description and comparison of these mechanisms, see Bradlow, ‘Comparative Study’ 
2005.
93 World Bank Inspection Panel Res No ibrd 93–10 & Res No ida 93–6, 22 September 1993, 
para 12 (“The affected party must demonstrate that its rights or interests have been or are 
likely to be directly affected by an action or omission of the Bank as a result of a failure of 
the Bank to follow its operational policies and procedures with respect to the design, ap-
praisal and/or implementation of a project financed by the Bank […] provided in all cases 
that such failure has had, or threatens to have, a material adverse effect”).
94 World Bank Operational Manual, op 4.10. There is a reference to human rights in Opera-
tional Policy 4.10 regarding Indigenous Peoples, which notes at the outset that the policy 
“contributes to the Bank’s mission of poverty reduction and sustainable development by 
ensuring that the development process fully respects the dignity, human rights, econo-
mies, and cultures of Indigenous Peoples”.
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‘ practice and necessity’.95 And although they are not identical, the resulting 
inspection mechanisms converge across institutions to a significant degree.96
While particular customary international law can tailor rules to internation-
al organizations as a group, or to certain groups of international organizations, 
it bears emphasis that there is some further room for tailoring obligations to 
individual organizations. As noted above, customary international law rules 
bind international organizations as a default matter; as a result, member States 
have some capacity to alter the applicable customary international law rules 
by creating lex specialis.97 Because States are not permitted to alter customary 
international law rules on human rights to the detriment of beneficiaries, this 
route is not available to eliminate altogether the obligation to afford effective 
remedies.98 This route is available, however, to further specify the details of 
individual organizations’ obligations to afford effective remedies.
Whether international organizations’ practice with respect to providing al-
ternative remedies adds up to a rule of particular customary international law 
ultimately depends not only on the consistency of this practice across interna-
tional organizations (or some subset of international organizations), but also 
on the motivations for that practice—specifically, whether it is undertaken 
with a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris. For this reason, it matters not 
only what international organizations do, but what they say about why they do 
it. The next section urges international organizations to say more.
5 Breaking the Silence
International organizations ought to not only ensure that they have in place 
dispute settlement mechanisms that satisfy the procedural and substantive re-
quirements of effective remedies—but also acknowledge customary interna-
tional law obligations to do so. By publicly engaging in discourse about their 
95 Boisson de Chazournes 2012, 174.
96 Ibid.
97 See Daugirdas, ‘How and Why’ 2016, 347–348, and accompanying text for n 40–41.
98 Koskenniemi 2006, paras 108–109; Bradley and Gulati 2010, 211–212; ibrd Articles of 
Agreement, art iv, s 10. This point is especially important when considering the impact on 
customary obligations, if any, of language prohibiting political activity in the constituent 
instruments of numerous multilateral development banks. For the World Bank, the rele-
vant language is that, “The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs 
of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character 
of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant 
to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to 
achieve the purposes stated in Article i”.
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international obligations to afford effective remedies, international organiza-
tions can actively shape the development of customary international law in 
this area, counter the narrative that their immunities place them above the 
law, and bolster their reputations and their legitimacy.
International organizations’ effectiveness depends, in part, on their reputa-
tions and perceptions of their legitimacy.99 One important aspect of interna-
tional organizations’ reputations—and by extension their legitimacy—is their 
reputation for legality.100 In a narrower sense, a reputation for legality depends 
on compliance with legal obligations. Perhaps one motivation for internation-
al organizations’ silence with respect to their obligations to afford effective 
remedies (and their obligations under customary international law more gen-
erally) is the desire to preserve their reputations for legality. Just as, for exam-
ple, States might avoid putting their reputations for compliance on the line by 
becoming parties to certain treaties, so too might international organizations 
try to avoid risking their reputations for compliance by not acknowledging ob-
ligations under customary international law.
Such an approach is misguided and ultimately self-defeating. To start, inter-
national organizations do not insulate themselves from charges that they are 
non-compliant by not acknowledging the existence of binding obligations in 
the first place. Thus, for example, in the course of recent litigation challenging 
the immunity of the International Finance Corporation (ifc), which ultimate-
ly reached the United States Supreme Court in the case Jam v ifc, Daniel Bra-
dlow argued that the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman—the ifc’s variation 
of the wbip—does not qualify as an effective remedy.101 Moreover, in a broad-
er sense, a reputation for legality depends on adherence to rule-of-law values 
99 See Boon 2016, 375 (“[A]s a matter of public legitimacy, the UN must not be seen to be 
above the law”); Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and Responsibility’ 2014, 1007–1009. For examples 
in the popular press, see Yeoman, 27 September 2018; Rosen, 26 February 2013 (“The or-
ganization is functionally above the law—and victims of Haiti’s cholera outbreak aren’t 
the only ones paying the price”); see also Daugirdas, ‘Reputation as a Disciplinarian’ 2019, 
225–235.
100 Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and Responsibility’ 2014, 1012–1016; Daugirdas, ‘Reputation as a 
Disciplinarian’ 2019, 228.
101 Bradlow, ‘Amicus Brief ’, 7 August 2016, 17–18 and 22–23 (arguing that the Compliance Ad-
visor Ombudsman meets some but not all of the criteria for effective remedies: “It is ac-
cessible to all qualifying stakeholders and it is reasonably fair, although the complainant 
is not necessarily given an opportunity to respond to the evidence and arguments pre-
sented by the ifc’s management. It is not clearly impartial because the ifc’s Board and 
senior management retain final decision making powers. Moreover, it is not independent 
because the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman is appointed by and reports to the senior 
management of the ifc. In addition, it does not necessarily provide the complainants 
with a meaningful remedy because its findings and recommendations are non-binding”).
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and norms.102 When international organizations fail to provide effective rem-
edies, they are vulnerable to the charge that they are above the law, or that they 
are abusing their immunities—and as a result, their reputations for legality in 
the broader sense remain at risk.103
Separately, although the trend is not universal, courts that are asked to up-
hold the immunity of international organizations are increasingly concerned 
not just with the existence—but also with the adequacy—of alternative dis-
pute settlement mechanisms.104 Sometimes the motivation for evaluating the 
adequacy of those mechanisms is ensuring compliance with the State’s own 
human rights obligations. Thus, for example, in Waite and Kennedy v Germany, 
the European Court of Human Rights held that,
[A] material factor in determining whether granting [the European Space 
Agency] immunity from German jurisdiction is permissible under the 
[European Convention on Human Rights] is whether the applicants had 
available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively 
their rights under the Convention.105
In other cases, the adequacy of alternative mechanisms may affect the policy 
decisions of national governments. When Jam v ifc reached the US Supreme 
Court, only one justice—Justice Breyer—was willing to uphold the absolute 
immunity of the ifc.106 Justice Breyer likewise emphasized the importance of 
adequate dispute settlement mechanisms. He observed that, if the alternative 
102 Hurd 2005 (describing the serious threat that Libya posed to the UN Security Council in 
part by portraying it as acting inconsistently with the rule of law in imposing sanctions in 
the wake of the bombing of Pan Am 103).
103 Berenson 2012, 145 (noting that abuse of immunities occurs “when international organi-
zations and their officials do not provide alternative independent means for recourse for 
claims against them”); see also Boon 2016, 375 (“[A]s a matter of public legitimacy, the UN 
must not be seen to be above the law”); Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and Responsibility’ 2014, 
1007–1009. For examples in the popular press, see Yeoman, 27 September 2018; Rosen, 26 
February 2013 (‘The organization is functionally above the law—and victims of Haiti’s 
cholera outbreak aren’t the only ones paying the price’).
104 See Reinisch, ‘Immunity’ 2008, 285 (observing that, when adjudicating cases involving the 
immunity of international organizations, “more and more national courts are […] looking 
at the availability and adequacy of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms”); Martha 
2012, 119–120 (describing such cases in Argentine courts).
105 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v Germany 1999, para 68. See also Singer 1995, 90–95; Treichl 
2019, 417–429 (describing relevant case law subsequent to Waite and Kennedy).
106 US Supreme Court, Jam v ifc 2019, dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer.
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mechanisms proved inadequate, the relevant statute allowed the US executive 
branch to set aside the organization’s immunity.107
International organizations that can credibly characterize their alternative 
mechanisms as satisfying customary international law standards with respect 
to the provision of effective remedies will be better able to defend those mech-
anisms as ‘adequate’—and thereby discourage national governments and na-
tional courts from evaluating adequacy on the basis of idiosyncratic or ‘chau-
vinistic’ criteria.108 Particular customary international law regarding effective 
remedies can supply standards that are not only international, but also tai-
lored to the specific context of international organizations.
As an example of constructive participation in the discourse about effective 
remedies, consider former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s commentary 
regarding the essential features of mechanisms for challenging the continued 
imposition of targeted sanctions by the Security Council. The routes available 
for challenging such sanctions have evolved over time. Initially, targeted indi-
viduals and entities were able to seek delisting only through their national gov-
ernments.109 Starting in 2006, they were able to make such demands directly 
through a ‘focal point’.110 For what is today the targeted sanctions regime for 
isil and Al-Qaida, targeted individuals and entities may present petitions for 
delisting to an Ombudsperson appointed by the UN Secretary-General.111 The 
Ombudsperson then gathers information from various sources and engages 
with the petitioner to explain the process and collect additional information if 
needed; ultimately the Ombudsperson makes a recommendation to the Secu-
rity Council to maintain or terminate the listing.112 If the Ombudsperson rec-
ommends delisting, the individual or entity will be removed from the sanc-
tions list unless, within 60 days, a committee of the Security Council members 
decides, by consensus, to retain the listing—or if the Security Council makes a 
decision to maintain the listing. To date, none of the Ombudsperson’s recom-
mendations have been overturned.113
Kimberly Prost, who served as the first Ombudsperson, has argued that the 
appropriate standard for evaluating the Ombudsperson process was articulat-
ed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In 2006, Annan set out what 
107 Ibid.
108 Prost 2017, 224.
109 Kingsbury and others 2005, 32 and 34.
110 Forcese and Roach 2010, 225 (recounting the evolution of the focal point and ombudsper-
son mechanisms).
111 unsc Res 1904, 17 December 2009, paras 20–21; unsc, ‘Ombudsperson to the isil’.
112 Ibid.
113 unsc, ‘Ombudsperson to the isil’.
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were, in his view, the minimum standards for ensuring that the procedures for 
listing and delisting individuals were “fair and transparent”.114 On the proce-
dural side, Annan explained, listed persons have a “right to be heard, via sub-
missions in writing, within a reasonable time by the relevant decision-making 
body […] as well as the right to be assisted or represented by counsel”.115 In 
addition, listed persons have a “right to review by an effective review mecha-
nism”, where effectiveness “will depend on its impartiality, degree of independ-
ence and ability to provide an effective remedy, including the lifting of the 
measure and/or, under specific conditions to be determined, compensation”.116
Prost praised Annan’s enunciation of these requirements as “carefully craft-
ed, taking into account realities of the practice of the Security Council and 
what might be achievable in that very particular context”.117 As for how the 
Ombudsperson mechanism measures up, Prost argued that the Ombudsper-
son mechanism “as designed and operating in practice to date fulfills the fun-
damental requirements of an effective review mechanism; one which provides 
an equivalent protection to judicial review by an independent tribunal”.118 The 
UN Secretary-General’s intervention didn’t preclude further debate about or 
criticism of the adequacy of the Ombudsperson mechanism.119 But, as Prost 
points out, Annan helpfully defined standards that were specifically tailored 
for an international organization, and that could—and ought to—anchor 
evaluations of the Ombudsperson mechanism.
When it comes to defining what constitutes an effective remedy in the spe-
cific context of international organizations, another valuable resource is the 
literature on global administrative law. This field focuses on “the mechanisms, 
principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or 
114 unsc, ‘5474th Meeting’ 22 June 2006, 5.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Prost 2017, 232.
118 Ibid, 233.
119 ecj, European Commission et al. v Yassin Abdullah Kadi 2013, paras 133–134. Most notably, 
in reviewing measures to implement Security Council sanctions, the Court of Justice for 
the European Union declined to accord any significance to the existence of the Ombud-
sperson mechanism because that mechanism did not guarantee effective judicial protec-
tion as it had been defined by the European Court of Human Rights, which asks whether 
the person concerned can “obtain a declaration from a court, by means of a judgment 
ordering annulment whereby the contested measure is retroactively erased from the legal 
order and is deemed never to have existed, that the listing of his name, or the continued 
listing of his name, on the list was vitiated by illegality, the recognition of which may re-
establish the reputation for that person or constitute for him a form of reparation for the 
non-material harm he has suffered”.
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otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies”.120 These 
principles and mechanisms include ex post review by judicial or other similar 
bodies121—as well as other complementary principles and mechanisms, such 
as transparency, reason-giving, and participation in decision-making.122 Schol-
arship in this area has devoted considerable attention to review mechanisms 
like the wbip, the UN Security Counsel Ombudsperson, and the ifc Compli-
ance Advisor Ombudsman.123 For example, Benjamin Saper argues that the 
ifc Compliance Advisor Ombudsman has advanced the interests of individu-
als affected by projects funded by the ifc by increasing the ifc’s responsive-
ness to these individuals—even though the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman 
lacks the authority to halt projects or to award compensation to injured 
individuals.124
Notably, while global administrative law can inform evaluations of the 
scope and content of customary obligations to provide effective remedies, the 
recognition of such obligations can also advance the aims of global adminis-
trative law. While scholars in the field have developed a normative case for the 
adoption of certain principles and mechanisms, they have devoted less atten-
tion to arguing that international organizations have legal obligations to do 
so.125 That said, they have recognized that locating such obligations in tradi-
tional sources of international law “may be the best way to maintain legal pre-
dictability and to sustain rule of law values in international relations”.126 Cus-
tomary international law obligations to provide effective remedies supply just 
that: a way to cement certain global administrative law principles in a tradi-
tional source of binding law that applies to international organizations.
To be sure, by engaging in discourse about their obligations to afford effec-
tive remedies, international organizations would face certain risks and costs. 
120 Kingsbury and others 2005, 17.
121 Ibid, 39–40; Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance 2014, 240–285.
122 Kingsbury and others 2005, 37–39; Stewart 2014 (distinguishing ex post accountability 
mechanisms from other related and complementary mechanisms).
123 See Kingsbury and others 2005, 39–40; Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance 2014, 
240–285; Saper 2012.
124 Saper 2012.
125 To the extent scholars have tried to ground global administrative law principles in bind-
ing sources of law, they have not focused on traditional sources and have not coalesced 
around any unified theory. Compare Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance 2014, 91–
137 (suggesting that such principles are binding based on ‘rule of law’ principles, interna-
tional human rights law, or trusteeship) with Kingsbury and others 2005, 29 (proposing a 
“revived version of ius gentium”).
126 Kingsbury 2005, 148.
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First, organizations will be constrained by their own legal arguments.127 Most 
importantly, having acknowledged legal obligations to afford effective reme-
dies, international organizations will need to confront the possibility that their 
existing accountability mechanisms fall short of any plausible interpretation 
of those obligations—and that those mechanisms need to be reformed ac-
cordingly. In addition, acknowledging customary international law obligations 
to provide effective remedies may increase pressure on international organiza-
tions to recognize other customary obligations, particularly obligations based 
on international human rights law. International organizations may also con-
front increased demands by individuals for compensation. At the end of the 
day, however, international organizations’ current approach is sure to be even 
more costly by eroding their legitimacy and support for their immunities.
Human rights advocates might raise a different objection—that by exhort-
ing international organizations to shape the customary international law rules 
that bind them, we are inviting international organizations to minimize their 
obligations. In our view, this risk is not significant. One feature of legal argu-
ments is that they are not infinitely elastic: implausible arguments about, for 
example, what constitutes an effective remedy will encounter vociferous ob-
jections from scholars, activists and UN special rapporteurs, among others.128 
Separately, there are countervailing advantages to international organizations’ 
express participation in discourse about their international obligations. By ac-
knowledging international obligations with respect to effective remedies, in-
ternational organizations would limit their discretion to ‘backslide’ by paring 
back or eliminating such mechanisms. This consequence is important in light 
of some member States’ limited enthusiasm for them.129 Finally, participation 
in the development of norms can bolster compliance with those norms. 
Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran made this point when addressing 
parallel concerns regarding their proposal that armed opposition groups be 
127 See generally Johnstone 2011. For example, Johnstone points out that a government’s (or, 
by extension, an international organization’s) rhetorical acceptance of a norm creates a 
“discursive opening” for critics to challenge its compliance with that norm, eventually 
inducing governments (or, by extension, international organizations) “to match deeds 
with words”. Ibid, 27.
128 Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and Responsibility’ 2014, 998 (noting the range of actors who par-
ticipate in transnational discourse in various forums about international organizations’ 
legal obligations and compliance with those obligations, and noting that that these actors 
can “initiate and perpetuate discussion, they can contribute new legal arguments or rel-
evant facts, and they can evaluate legal arguments”).
129 Bradlow, ‘Multilateral Development Banks’ 2019, 29–30 (noting the persistence of ten-
sions that independent accountability mechanisms created between borrower and credi-
tor member states of multilateral development banks).
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allowed to participate in the creation of international humanitarian law.130 
Giving ordinarily excluded groups a role in lawmaking affords them a sense of 
ownership in the law, which makes it psychologically easier for them to accept 
and respect those laws.131 Such participation can also help to assure that the 
rules that are established are rules with which regulated entities can realisti-
cally comply.132
6 Conclusion
As international organizations affect individuals in ever-expanding ways,133 it 
is increasingly apparent that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are 
needed to protect and redress those harmed by these international actors. This 
chapter urges international organizations not only to establish such mecha-
nisms, but also to acknowledge customary international law obligations to pro-
vide effective remedies.
There are several benefits to recognizing a customary international law ob-
ligation on international organizations to provide effective remedies. From the 
perspective of international organizations, it offers a way to protect their exist-
ing immunities and to develop customary norms that are tailored specifically 
to them. From the perspective of international human rights law, it offers a way 
to apply human rights law to powerful, non-State actors—and increases the 
likelihood that those obligations will be implemented. And from the perspec-
tive of global administrative law, a customary obligation offers a way to cement 
accountability-promoting principles in a traditional source of binding law.
Recognizing this customary obligation is, of course, not costless. It may ex-
pose international organizations to increased pressures and demands for com-
pensation, and it might allow international organizations to water down the 
content of their obligations. The authors of this chapter are not blind to these 
costs. But we believe that the risks and costs of the status quo are even 
greater.
130 Roberts and Sivakumaran 2012, 126–127 and 151.
131 Ibid, 127; Blokker 2017, 10 (“Why should [international organizations] fully comply with 
rules of customary international law without being able to fully participate in its 
development?”).
132 Roberts and Sivakumaran 2012, 139; see also Prost 2017, 232 (noting this advantage with 
respect to the minimum standards articulated by former Secretary-General Annan in the 
context of Security Council targeted sanctions).
133 Kingsbury and others 2005, 23–25.
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